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NOTES
DEFENSE WITNESS IMMUNITY IN NEW YORK
INTRODUCTION
A criminal defendant's right to exculpatory evidence' and com-
pulsory process 2 are two critical components of due process.3
These rights are not absolute, however. When they conflict with a
witness's testimonial privilege 4 or when exculpatory evidence is
otherwise unavailable through no fault of the prosecution, 5 the de-
fendant has traditionally been required to prepare his defense with-
out such evidence. 6 Some defendants have successfully challenged
their convictions when a deprivation of exculpatory evidence results
1 The right to exculpatory evidence is an implied element of due process. See
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (defendant's right to present excul-
patory witnesses is fundamental element of due process); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 19 (1967) (same); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (prosecution's suppres-
sion of exculpatory evidence violates due process); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S.
53, 60-61, 65 (1957) (prosecutor's refusal to disclose identity of government informer
may violate due process when it denies defendant material exculpatory evidence). For
arguments that these cases support a right to defense witness immunity, see, e.g., Note,
The Due Process Right to the Immunization of Defense Witnesses, 22 B.C.L. REv. 299, 302-06
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Due Process Right]; Note, The Constitutional Right to
Defense Witness Immunity, 57 N.D.L. REV. 187, 213-16 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note,
The Constitutional Right]; Comment, A Right to Testimony of Immunized Defense Witnesses, 12 U.
BALT. L. REV. 294, 304-08 (1983). But see Note, The Case Against a Right to Defense fitness
Immunity, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 139, 146-48 (1983) (arguing that Chambers, Brady and
Roviaro do not support a right to defense witness immunity) [hereinafter cited as Note,
The Case Against].
2 The sixth amendment provides that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall . . . have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
3 The fourteenth amendment provides that states shall not deprive persons "of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
4 The Constitution provides that "[no person. . . shall be compelled in any crim-
inal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. States have created
other testimonial privileges by statute. For a discussion of the testimonial privileges
available in New York, see 2 M. WAXNER, NEW YORK CRIMINAL PRACTICE $ 15.11 (1985);
5 J. ZE-r, NEw YORK CRIMINAL PRACTICE ch. 35 (1985).
5 For example, exculpatory evidence will be unavailable when a defense witness
has died, cannot be located, or has refused to testify after a grant of immunity. See Wes-
ten, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91
HARV. L. REV. 567, 597 (1978). For a discussion of New York law concerning contempt
proceedings against a witness who improperly refuses to testify after receiving immu-
nity, see 2 M. WAXNER, supra note 4, 15.10.
6 See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1077 (1981). See also Hill, Testimonial Privilege And Fair Trial, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1173, 1181 (1980).
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from a prosecutor's refusal to grant immunity for a defense wit-
ness.7 These cases arise when a witness, fearing prosecution for a
crime his testimony will reveal, invokes his fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination and refuses to testify. Courts that ac-
cept the defendant's argument require the prosecutor to immunize
the defense witness as a condition to the defendant's prosecution.
Defense witness immunity cases require courts to balance care-
fully the rights of the defendant and the witness, and the responsi-
bilities of the state. On the one hand, defense witness immunity
should be freely granted because the prosecutor, although an actor
in an adversarial system, has an ethical duty to ensure that justice is
done.8 Immunizing a key defense witness ensures that the jury re-
ceives all probative exculpatory evidence. On the other hand, im-
munity was not created for this altruistic purpose, but rather was
designed as a prosecutorial tool to facilitate convictions by immuniz-
ing prosecution witnesses. 9 Moreover, a forced conferral of immu-
7 See United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887, 891-92 (9th Cir. 1983) (defendant's con-
viction vacated and case remanded for determination whether prosecutor coerced de-
fense witness to invoke privilege); Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 973-74 (3d Cir.
1980) (defendant's conviction vacated because prosecutor's unjustified refusal of immu-
nity deprived defendant of essential exculpatory evidence); United States v. Morrison,
535 F.2d 223, 227-29 (3d Cir. 1976) (conviction reversed because prosecutor caused
defense witness to refuse to testify by aggressively threatening him with prosecution for
perjury); United States v. De Palma, 476 F. Supp. 775, 776, 779-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(defendant's conviction reversed because prosecutor selectively immunized witnesses),
remanded for reconsideration sub nom. United States v. Horwitz, 622 F.2d 1101, 1105-06 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981).
Only one state court outside of New York has reversed a conviction on defense
witness immunity grounds. See State v. Broady, 41 Ohio App. 2d 17, 22, 24, 321 N.E.2d
890, 894, 896 (1974) (conviction reversed because trial court, statutorily authorized to
grant immunity, refused immunity where testimony was vital and exculpatory and there
was no indication that immunity grant would interfere with prosecution of witness).
Several other state courts, however, have stated in dicta that a right to defense witness
immunity exists. E.g., State v. Montgomery, 467 So. 2d 387, 390-96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (dictum) (if prosecutorial misconduct violates defendant's compulsory process
and due process rights, trial may proceed only if prosecution grants immunity to defense
witness); State v. Summers, 197 NJ. Super. 510, 514-18, 485 A.2d 335, 336-38 (Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1984) (dictum) (judiciary has inherent power to protect defendant's due
process rights by grant of immunity to defense witness).
8 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (prosecutor must strive to ac-
complish impartialjustice); N.Y.JUD. LAW app. EC 7-13 (McKinney 1975) (Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility) ("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of
the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.") (footnote omit-
ted); STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINALJUSTICE § 1.1(c) (1979)
(same) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS]. For a general discussion of the ethical princi-
ples governing prosecuting attorneys, see R. MCNAMARA, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrrATIONS
ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ch. 9 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
9 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446-47 (1972); see also Mykkeltvedt,
United States v. Alessio-Due Process of Law and Federal Grants of Witness Immunity for De-
fense Witnesses, 31 MERCER L. REV. 689, 691-92 (1980); Note, Defense Witness Immunity, 9
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 199, 202-03, 205-06 & n.45 (1981). Contra Note, Balancing the
Interests Involved in Granting Defense Witness Immunity, 45 ALB. L. REV. 801, 805 & n.23
8911986]
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nity interferes with the subsequent prosecution of the immunized
witness and hence restricts the discretion traditionally accorded
prosecutors in deciding whom to prosecute.' 0 Finally, in deciding
these cases courts must protect the constitutional rights of witnesses
and consider what their proper role is under the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers."
Defense witness immunity has been an especially dynamic issue
in the federal courts. All of the circuit courts of appeals have con-
sidered the subject during the last ten years, and although the de-
fendants have rarely prevailed on the defense witness immunity
issue, none of the courts has rejected the contention that under
some circumstances a prosecutor's refusal of immunity for a defense
witness might be reversible error. 12 Although a defendant's right to
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Balancing the Interests] ("[Some] courts have held that
the underlying purpose of immunity statutes is to provide an opportunity to uncover all
pertinent evidence that would assist a finder of fact in determining guilt or innocence.").
10 See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) ("Whether to prose-
cute and what charge to file . . . are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's
discretion."); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (prosecutors generally
accorded broad discretion); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) ("Execu-
tive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prose-
cute a case"); People v. DiFalco, 44 N.Y.2d 482,486, 377 N.E.2d 732,735,406 N.Y.S.2d
279, 282 (1978) (per curiam) ("District Attorney has broad discretion in determining
when and in what manner to prosecute a suspected offender"). See generally D. JONES,
THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 282-88 (1981); 2 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE ch. 13 (1984).
11 Some commentators have argued that any judicial interference with the prosecu-
tion's use of immunity violates the doctrine of separation of powers because the legisla-
ture created immunity to enable an agency of the executive branch to perform its role.
These commentators assert that judicial noninterference is mandated because the judici-
ary lacks the experience and expertise to decide when a prospective witness should be
prosecuted or granted immunity. E.g., Flanagan, Compelled Immunity for Defense Witnesses:
Hidden Costs and Questions, 56 NOTRE DAME LAw. 447, 463-72 (1981); Note, The Case
Against, supra note 1, at 151, 153-57; Comment, supra note 1, at 302-03. Other commen-
tators, however, argue that courts do not violate separation of powers by reviewing a
prosecutor's refusal of immunity. See Note, Balancing the Interests, supra note 9, at 807-08;
Note, Judicial Immunity for Criminal Defense Witnesses: A Safeguard for the Defendant's Sixth
Amendment Right to Compulsory Process, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 481, 503-04 (1981). Several
commentators have adopted a median position, arguing that a compelled grant of
use/derived use immunity is constitutional but that forced conferral of transactional im-
munity violates separation of powers because it bars any subsequent prosecution of the
witness for crimes revealed. E.g., Note, The Constitutional Right, supra note 1, at 204-06;
Comment, Current Controversies Concerning Witness Immunity in the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L.
REV. 123, 145 n.120 (1981). Finally, one individual has suggested that although courts
violate the separation of powers doctrine when they require a prosecutor to confer im-
munity under an immunity statute, no constitutional violation occurs when a court con-
fers immunity using its inherent powers. See Note, Defense Witness Immunity, supra note 9,
at 208-12, 224-26.
12 Except for the Third Circuit, see supra note 7, no circuit court has accepted the
argument that a grant of defense witness immunity might be constitutionally required
absent prosecutorial misconduct. Five circuit courts have stated explicitly that
prosecutorial misconduct requires either dismissal of the charges against the defendant
892 [Vol. 71:890
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witness immunity in the federal courts is still very much in question,
the New York Court of Appeals has established the right to defense
witness immunity in certain cases.
This Note analyzes the development of defense witness immu-
nity in New York and evaluates the current status of defense witness
immunity in the state. The Note criticizes the New York Court of
Appeals's analytical approach to defense witness immunity as well as
certain ambiguities in the court's opinions. The Note then provides
recommendations for judicial and legislative reforms that will pro-
tect the witness's rights and the prosecutor's discretion while in-
creasing defendants' access to exculpatory testimony.
or a grant of defense witness immunity in at least some cases. See United States v. Bums,
684 F.2d 1066, 1077 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983); United States v.
Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 839-40 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984); United
States v. Wilson, 715 F.2d 1164, 1173 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1049 (1984);
United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887, 890-92 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Gottesman,
724 F.2d 1517, 1524 & n.9 (11th Cir. 1984).
Four other circuit courts have suggested that immunity might, be constitutionally
required when prosecutorial misconduct occurs and the prosecutor does not dismiss the
charges against the defendant. See United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 517-20 (4th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 640-41 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
825 (1982); McGee v. Crist, 739 F.2d 505, 509 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Heldt,
668 F.2d 1238, 1282-83 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982). Two appel-
late courts have distinguished prosecutorial misconduct situations from other defense
witness immunity cases but have reserved the question whether a court may grant judi-
cial relief. See United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188, 192-93 (1st Cir. 1980); United States
v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 526-29 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 906 (1985). Fi-
nally, the Eighth Circuit has yet to address the prosecutorial misconduct question. See
United States v. Hardrich, 707 F.2d 992, 993-94 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991
(1983).
The Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari on defense witness immunity
cases. See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 270 n.4 (1983) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring). For an analysis that concludes that the Court will establish at least a limited right
to defense witness immunity, see Mykkeltvedt, supra note 9, at 704-05 n.70 (dictum in
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), indicates Court may endorse defense wit-
ness immunity); Note, Defense Witness Immunity, supra note 9, at 219-20 (Court's analysis
in Washington and Brady points to right to defense witness immunity); Note, The Constitu-
tional Right, supra note 1, at 211 & ft.164 (Court may endorse right to defense witness
immunity based on Nixon and Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968)).
The rationale behind the Court's efforts to restrict the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule also supports the right to defense witness immunity. See, e.g., United States
v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 285 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Any rule of law which
operates to keep an eyewitness to a crime. . . from telling the jury what that person saw
has a rational basis roughly comparable to the primitive rituals of human sacrifice.").
For an analysis that generally supports a right to defense witness immunity, see,
e.g., Comment, Defense Witness Immunity: Constitutional Demands and Statutory Change, 72 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1026 (1981); Note, The Constitutional Right, supra note 1; Note,
Witnessfor the Defense: A Right to Immunity, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1665 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Witness for the Defense]. For an analysis that is generally critical of defense witness
immunity, see, e.g., Flanagan, supra note 11; Note, The Case Against, supra note 1.
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I
THE NEW YORK IMMUNITY STATUTE
Article 50 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law describes
the immunity available to a witness in a criminal trial.' 3 The statute
specifies that a witness who invokes his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination can be compelled to testify only when
granted immunity. 14 Although the judge confers immunity, the
prosecution actually controls this tool because a court may grant
immunity "only when expressly requested by the district attor-
ney."' 5 New York utilizes the broad "transactional immunity" that
13 Section 50.20 provides in relevant part:
1. Any witness in a legal proceeding, other than a grand jury pro-
ceeding, may refuse to give evidence requested of him on the ground that
it may tend to incriminate him and he may not, except as provided in
subdivision two, be compelled to give such evidence.
2. Such a witness may be compelled to give evidence in such a pro-
ceeding notwithstanding an assertion of his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation if:
(a) The proceeding is one in which, by express provision of stat-
ute, a person conducting or connected therewith is declared a com-
petent authority to confer immunity upon witnesses therein; and
(b) Such competent authority (i) orders such witness to give the
requested evidence notwithstanding his assertion of his privilege
against self-incrimination, and (ii) advises him that upon so doing he
will receive immunity.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 50.20 (McKinney 1981).
Immunity before a grand jury, a subject beyond the scope of this Note, is governed
by § 190.40 of the New York Criminal Procedure Code. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 190.40 (McKinney 1982). See generally C. BROWNELL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NEW
YORK Pt. I, ch. 14 (rev. ed. 1985); 1 M. WAXNER, supra note 4, 8.15-.16.
14 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 50.20. A witness must formally invoke the fifth amend-
ment before immunity can be granted. Id. Invocation of the fifth amendment is subject
to judicial review to ensure that the witness is not attempting to avoid testifying for an
improper reason, such as to avoid mere social stigma. See 2 M. WAXNER, supra note 4,
15.212]. New York courts, however, will force a witness to testify only when he "contu-
maciously refuses, or when it is perfectly clear and plain that he is mistaken, and that the
answer cannot possibly injure him, or tend in any degree to subject him to the peril of
prosecution." People ec rel. Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N.Y. 219, 231, 38 N.E. 303, 306
(1894). See also In re Gwydir, 91 A.D.2d 995, 995-96, 457 N.Y.S.2d 856, 857 (2d Dep't
1983) (mem. op.). For a detailed discussion of the invocation of the privilege against
self-incrimination, see 2 M. WAXNER, supra note 4, 15.2[2]; Note, The Fifth Amendment
Testimonial Privilege as an Impediment to the Defense When Invoked by a Potential Exculpatory
Witness, 42 ALB. L. REV. 482, 485-90 (1978).
15 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 50.30 (McKinney 1981). Section 50.30 states: "In any
criminal proceeding, other than a grand jury proceeding, the court is a competent au-
thority to confer immunity in accordance with the provisions of section 50.20, but only
when expressly requested by the district attorney to do so." Id. The trial judge appar-
ently has discretion to deny the prosecution's request, although no criteria are specified
in the statute. H. ROTHBLATr, CRIMINAL LAW OF NEW YORK: THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
LAW § 93 (1971); 2 M. WAXNER, spra note 4, 15.2[4][a]. See Brockway v. Monroe, 59
N.Y.2d 179, 191,451 N.E.2d 168, 174, 464 N.Y.S.2d 410,416 (1983) (JasenJ., dissent-
ing) (court exercises discretion when granting immunity); People v. Mordino, 83 A.D.2d
775, 776, 443 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470 (4th Dep't) (mem. op.) (trial court might not have
[Vol. 71:890894
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prohibits prosecution of the immunized witness for "any transac-
tion, matter or thing" revealed by the testimony.16 Prosecution is
still possible, however, when the witness commits perjury while tes-
granted immunity even if requested by prosecution), appeal denied, 54 N.Y.2d 1030, 430
N.E.2d 1326, 446 N.Y.S.2d 1031 (1981).
16 N.Y. GRIM. PROC. LAw § 50.10(1) (McKinney 1981). Traditionally, immunity stat-
utes have provided for one of three basic types of immunity: transactional, use, and
use/derived use. Transactional immunity provides the greatest protection for the wit-
ness because "it prohibits a subsequent prosecution of the immune witness which is
based upon a transaction, matter or occurrence about which he testified or produced
evidence." Comment, supra note 11, at 127. Use immunity provides the least protection
for the witness because the prosecution is prohibited only from using the witness's testi-
mony itself in a subsequent prosecution. Id. Under use immunity, the prosecution is
free to utilize the testimony to discover other admissible evidence of guilt. Use/derived
use, also known as testimonial immunity, prohibits the prosecution from using the wit-
ness's testimony and any evidence derived from it in a case against the witness. Id. This
form of immunity allows the district attorney to prosecute the witness if the evidence
used was obtained from sources wholly independent of the witness's testimony. For a
discussion of the distinctions and relative merits of these types of immunity, see 1 W.
LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 10, § 8.11, at 688-90; Carlson, Witness Immunity in Modern
Trials: Observations on the Uniform Rule of Criminal Procedure, 67J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
131, 135-37 & nn.34 & 38 (1976); Thornburgh, Reconciling Effective Federal Prosecution and
the Fifth Amendment. "Criminal Coddling," "The New Torture" or "A Rational Accommodation?",
67J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155, 156-58 (1976).
The Supreme Court originally suggested in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547, 585-86 (1892), that only transactional immunity could be used to compel a wit-
ness's testimony over his fifth amendment privilege to avoid self-incrimination. Con-
gress responded by adopting a transactional immunity statute, which the Court upheld
in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). Under this statute, however, federal prosecu-
tors hesitated in granting immunity because it could give witnesses complete immunity
for serious crimes their testimony revealed. Keeney & Walsh, The American Bar Associa-
tion's Grand Jury Principles: A Critique from a Federal Criminal Justice Perspective, 14 IDAHo L.
REV. 545, 584 (1978); Note, Witnessfor the Defense, supra note 12, at 1686 & n.152. Con-
gress addressed this problem by enacting the Federal Immunity of Witnesses Act as part
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 201(a), 84 Stat. 922,
926-28 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1982)), which provided for use/derived use
immunity.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this statute in Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972), concluding that the protection conferred in
use/derived use immunity is coextensive with a witness's fifth amendment privilege.
The Kastigar court, however, held that use immunity is unconstitutional. Id. at 460-62.
Consequently, no state uses traditional "use immunity," and modem commentators
often refer to "use/derived use immunity" as "use immunity." This Note employs the
traditional labels for clarity.
Paralleling the federal Constitution, New York's constitution requires only
use/derived use immunity. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. United States cc rel. Gasparino v.
Butler, 398 F. Supp. 127, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); 2 M. WAXNER, supra note 4, 15.2[3][b].
See People v. La Bello, 24 N.Y.2d 598, 601-03, 249 N.E.2d 412, 413-15, 301 N.Y.S.2d
544, 546-49, cert. dismissed sub nom. Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971); Gold v.
Menna, 25 N.Y.2d 475, 481, 255 N.E.2d 235, 238, 387 N.Y.S.2d 33, 38 (1969), cert.
dismissed, 400 U.S. 548 (1971) (per curiam). Although the federal system has adopted
use/derived use immunity, the majority of states, including New York, continue to use
the broader transactional immunity by statute. 1 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 10,
§ 8.11, at 688 & n. 17. For a survey of the immunity statutes currently in force in all 50
states, see NATIONAL Ass'N oF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL LEGIS-
LATION 140-48, 150-55 (1975).
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tifying under immunity' 7 or the witness's answers are unresponsive
to the questions posed.' 8
II
DEVELOPMENT OF NEW YORK CASE LAW
A. People v. Sapia
The New York Court of Appeals first addressed the defense wit-
ness immunity issue in 1976. In People v. Sapia 19 the court faced the
question whether the prosecutor's refusal to immunize a witness
who refused to testify on fifth amendment grounds violated the de-
fendant's due process and fair trial rights when the defendant was
deprived of exculpatory testimony. Sapia involved a classic defense
witness immunity scenario: a witness, who had previously lied
under oath to federal authorities, was concerned that truthful testi-
mony would lead to prosecution for perjury. The trial court con-
cluded that the witness's testimony was material and exculpatory
and urged the prosecution to grant immunity. The prosecutor re-
fused and the defendant was subsequently convicted. 20 The appel-
late division affirmed in a split decision, 21 and the defendant
appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that
the prosecutor's refusal to grant immunity did not violate the de-
fendant's compulsory process or due process rights. The court
summarily rejected the defendant's compulsory process argument,
stating that the sixth amendment right "exists only to the extent that
witnesses may otherwise be compelled to attend and to testify; the
17 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 50.10(1) (McKinney 1981); People v. Shapiro, 50
N.Y.2d 747, 760, 409 N.E.2d 897, 904-05, 431 N.Y.S.2d 422, 429 (1980) (dictum). See
also United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131-32 (1980); 1 W. LAFAvE &J. ISRAEL,
supra note 10, § 8.11, at 685. For a detailed discussion of New York perjury law, see 2
M. WAXNER, supra note 4, 15.9.
18 Brockway v. Monroe, 59 N.Y.2d 179, 189, 451 N.E.2d 168, 173, 464 N.Y.S.2d
410, 415 (1983). See also I W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 10, § 8.11, at 685-86.
19 41 N.Y.2d 160,359 N.E.2d 688, 391 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823
(1977). In Sapia, the defendant was charged with selling narcotics to an undercover
police officer and sought to prove entrapment using the testimony of the witness/police
informant. Id. at 162, 359 N.E.2d at 689-90, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 94-95.
20 Id. at 162-64, 359 N.E.2d at 690-91, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 95-96.
21 People v. Sapia, 48 A.D.2d 524, 370 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Ist Dep't 1975). The major-
ity refused to compel immunity for the defense because of the overwhelming evidence
against the defendant and uncertainty concerning the probative value of the prospective
witness's testimony. Id. at 529, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 608. The dissent noted, however, that
the trial court had concluded that the witness's testimony would exculpate the defendant
and reasoned that the defendant's compulsory process right should override the prose-
cutor's interest in retaining the discretion to prosecute the witness, at least when the
district attorney had no reason to believe the witness's testimony would reveal any previ-
ously unknown crimes. Id. at 530-31, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 610-11 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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Constitution mandates no more." 22 The court analogized the Sapia
case to one in which exculpatory testimony is unavailable because a
witness is absent, invokes a recognized testimonial privilege, or im-
properly refuses to testify and risks being held in contempt. The
court of appeals reasoned that because a defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights are not violated in these situations, no constitutional
violation occurs when the prosecution refuses immunity for a de-
fense witness. 23
The court of appeals found the defendant's due process argu-
ment far more convincing. The court noted that suppression of ma-
terial evidence clearly violates due process. 24 The court reasoned,
however, that the events in Sapia did not constitute suppression be-
cause the prosecution had allowed the defense full access to the wit-
ness. 25 The court of appeals then considered whether the
defendant's fair trial right could require the prosecution to take af-
firmative steps to enable a witness to testify. The court decided no
such requirement existed in Sapia. Although the witness had been
instrumental in arranging the narcotics transactions which led to the
defendant's arrest, the witness had not directly participated in the
crimes. 26
The Sapia court stated in dictum that the prosecution might vio-
late a defendant's fair trial right if it refused immunity to a wit-
ness/informant who had actively participated in the crime as an
agent of the police. 27 In such a case, the court reasoned that it
would be unfair for the prosecution to rely on its discretion and
deny immunity, thereby suppressing exculpatory evidence, when
the police had created the problem by utilizing the witness as an
informant.2 8 The court concluded that in this situation the district
attorney either must grant immunity or forego prosecution, but ad-
ded that "[t]he delineation of the obligations of the prosecution and
of the rights of the defendant in such a situation . . .must await
another day." 29
22 41 N.Y.2d at 164, 359 N.E.2d at 691, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 96.
23 Id. at 164-65, 359 N.E.2d at 691, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 96.
24 Id. at 165, 359 N.E.2d at 691, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 96-97 (citing Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
25 Id. at 165-66, 359 N.E.2d at 691-92, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
26 Id. at 162, 165-66, 359 N.E.2d at 689, 691-92, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 94-95, 97. The
witness was apparently an eyewitness to at least one of the transactions, however. Id.
27 Id. at 166, 359 N.E.2d at 692, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 97 (dictum).
28 Id.
29 Id. The court of appeals decided another defense immunity case on the same day
as Sapia. In People v. Tyler, 40 N.Y.2d 1065, 1066, 360 N.E.2d 928, 929, 392 N.Y.S.2d
250, 250-51 (1976) (mem. op.), the court merely indicated in dictum that failure to im-
munize may violate due process if the defendant is deprived of exculpatory evidence.
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B. People v. Shapiro
During the three and a half years following Sapia, New York's
appellate courts decided three cases involving defense witness im-
munity. In each case the court affirmed the defendant's conviction
using the Sapia analysis. These decisions, however, provided only
minimal analysis and added little clarity to the law.30
In 1980 the court of appeals held for the first time that a prose-
cutor's refusal to immunize a witness could, in at least some cases,
violate the defendant's constitutional rights and require a reversal of
the defendant's conviction. In People v. Shapiro"' the defendant was
convicted of sodomy, promoting prostitution, and endangering the
welfare of a child. The appellate division affirmed without address-
ing the defense witness immunity issue,3 2 and the defendant
appealed.
In Shapiro the defendant's prospective witnesses wanted to give
truthful testimony but were concerned about prosecution for per-
jured testimony given during earlier proceedings. The district at-
torney threatened to prosecute the witnesses for perjury if their
testimony differed even slightly from that given earlier. Faced with
possible criminal prosecution, these individuals invoked the fifth
30 In People v. Aquarian Age 2000, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 838, 396 N.Y.S.2d 330 (2d
Dep't) (mem. op.), appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 999, 368 N.E.2d 48, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1042
(1977), the appellate division affirmed the defendant's conviction by merely citing Sapia
without discussing the issues involved. Id. at 838, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
In People v. Heffron, 59 A.D.2d 263, 399 N.Y.S.2d 501 (4th Dep't 1977), the de-
fendant alleged that his right to exculpatory testimony was violated by the prosecution's
refusal to immunize a prospective defense witness who invoked the fifth amendment.
The appellate division noted that the witness was neither a police informer nor a partici-
pant in the crime and that the trial record did not indicate that the witness's testimony
would be exculpatory. The court thus concluded that the defendant's rights to due pro-
cess and a fair trial were not violated because the facts in Hefron were "notably less
compelling for reversal than those in Sapia." Id. at 267, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 504. The court
did not discuss the sixth amendment compulsory process issue, apparently because the
defendant did not raise it.
The court of appeals returned to the defense witness immunity issue in People v.
Arroyo, 46 N.Y.2d 928, 388 N.E.2d 342, 415 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1979) (mem. op.). In a
cursory opinion the court of appeals concluded that the refusal of immunity for a pro-
spective defense witness did not violate the defendant's due process and fair trial rights.
The court stated: "It suffices for present purposes to note that the witness here was not
an agent of the law enforcement authorities or otherwise in any way a part of the
prosecutorial apparatus." Id. at 931, 388 N.E.2d at 343, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 206. The court
ignored the appellate division dissent's point that the witness could shed light on the
credibility of the prosecution's informer/witness and that the testimony would have ex-
culpated the defendant. See People v. Arroyo, 60 A.D.2d 914,916-17, 402 N.Y.S.2d 177,
180-81 (2d Dep't 1978) (TitoneJ., dissenting).
31 50 N.Y.2d 747, 409 N.E.2d 897, 431 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1980).
32 People v. Shapiro, 67 A.D.2d 958, 412 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (2d Dep't 1979) (mere.
op.). The court modified the trial result by reducing the sentence. Id. at 958. 412
N.Y.S.2d at 1019.
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amendment at trial. The court of appeals noted that the witnesses'
testimony would have been exculpatory, that the trial court repeat-
edly urged the prosecutor to immunize the witnesses, and that the
refusal of immunity deprived the defendant of all direct witnesses. 33
The court also noted that the only direct testimony the jury heard
came from a prosecution witness who could not be prosecuted be-
cause of his age and an earlier immunity grant.34 Based on these
facts, the court of appeals reversed the conviction in a split decision,
concluding that the denial of immunity violated the defendant's due
process and compulsory process rights. 35
Although the Shapiro court relied substantially on Sapia, the Sha-
piro analysis differed from Sapia in two significant ways. First, the
Sapia court had concluded that only a violation of due process could
justify a forced conferral of immunity to a defense witness. 36 In Sha-
piro the court overturned the defendant's conviction on both due
process and compulsory process grounds. 37 Second, the Sapia court
had indicated that only a refusal to immunize, coupled with affirma-
tive prosecutorial action that violated the defendant's rights, could
justify the reversal of a defendant's conviction.38 Although the Sha-
piro court continued to emphasize the prosecutor's actions in deter-
mining the propriety of the defendant's conviction,39 the court
appeared to establish a second avenue for defendants. The court
33 50 N.Y.2d at 759-60, 409 N.E.2d at 904, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 428-29. Evidence can
be classified as either "direct" or "circumstantial." "Direct evidence is evidence which,
if believed, resolves a matter in issue. [With circumstantial evidence, however,] even if
the circumstances depicted are accepted as true, additional reasoning is required to
reach the proposition to which it is directed." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 543
(E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
The court also stated the prosecutor had "disregard[ed] his professional obligation,
if not his ethical duty," by communicating his threats concerning prosecution for perjury
directly to the witnesses, thereby precluding them from conferring with counsel prior to
making the decision whether to testify. 50 N.Y.2d at 759, 409 N.E.2d at 903-04, 431
N.Y.S.2d at 428.
34 Id. at 759, 409 N.E.2d at 904, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
35 The court also reversed the defendant's conviction on two other unrelated
grounds. The court, however, left no doubt that the immunity issue was dispositive,
stating that "[w]e find merit in each of [defendant's] contentions" and conditioning re-
trial on a grant of immunity for the witness. Id. at 752, 762, 409 N.E.2d at 899, 906, 431
N.Y.S.2d at 424, 430.
36 41 N.Y.2d at 164-65, 359 N.E.2d at 691, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 96. See supra notes 22-
29 and accompanying text.
37 50 N.Y.2d at 760-62, 409 N.E.2d at 904-05, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 429-30.
38 41 N.Y.2d at 165-66, 359 N.E.2d at 691-92, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 97. See supra notes
24-29 and accompanying text.
39 In Shapiro the court identified selective immunization of prosecution witnesses as
one example of a prosecutorial violation of a defendant's due process rights. 50 N.Y.2d
at 760, 409 N.E.2d at 904, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 429. The Shapiro facts provide a second
example: a prosecutor caused a defense witness to refuse to testify by aggressively
threatening the prospective witness with prosecution for perjury. Id. at 760-61, 409
N.E.2d at 905, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 429-30.
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
stated that the prosecution may violate a defendant's due process
rights even without any affirmative action "where the failure to
grant immunity deprives the defendant of vital exculpatory testi-
mony." 40 The court, however, did not define "vital exculpatory tes-
timony" or explain whether legitimate prosecution interests would
affect this right.
Two judges on the court of appeals dissented in Shapiro and
voted to affirm the defendant's conviction. 41 The dissent differed
from the majority both in its analytical approach to the problem and
in the interpretation of a key factual issue. The dissent rejected the
majority's position that a refusal of immunity could violate a defend-
ant's compulsory process rights. They asserted that only due pro-
cess could compel a prosecutor to immunize a prospective
witness. 42 Furthermore, the dissent squarely rejected the majority's
contention that a denial of vital exculpatory evidence, absent any
affirmative prosecutorial action, could require the immunization of a
defense witness.43 Finally, the dissent concluded that the majority's
characterization of the district attorney's actions as "threatening"
and "menacing" was "patently unwarranted" and that the prosecu-
tion's warnings to the witnesses were in no way improper.44 The
dissent concluded its discussion of defense witness immunity by
warning:
Unless we are prepared to hold that the People have an absolute
obligation to confer immunity and to forswear any possibility of
future prosecution for prior perjury whenever a material defense
witness asserts his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimi-
40 Id. at 760, 409 N.E.2d at 904, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 429 (dictum).
41 Id. at 779, 409 N.E.2d at 917, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 442 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
Judge Jasen concurred with the dissent.
42 Id. at 771, 774 & n.6, 409 N.E.2d at 911,913-14 & n.6, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 436,438-
39 & n.6.
43 Id. at 774, 409 N.E.2d at 913-14, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 438-39. The dissent main-
tained that it did not matter that the prosecution's refusal to immunize deprived the
defendant of all direct witnesses. Id. at 775, 409 N.E.2d at 914, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
44 Id. at 774-75, 409 N.E.2d at 914, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 439-40. The dissent argued
that the witnesses' refusal to testify did not violate the defendant's rights because the
immunity issue was raised by the witnesses when they asked the prosecutor for immu-
nity. The dissent therefore concluded that this case fell within the general rule that the
compulsory process clause does not forbid prosecution of a defendant whose witnesses
are unavailable for reasons beyond the control of the prosecution. "[T]he underlying
source of the deprivation was the voluntary decisions by the witnesses to refrain from
testifying .. " Id. at 774, 409 N.E.2d at 913, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 439. The dissent, how-
ever, failed to explain why the origin of the immunity request should affect the constitu-
tionality of the prosecutor's refusal to grant immunity. Any competent attorney would
recognize the potential danger if his client testified about a past crime without immunity
and would request immunity to protect his client. Given the dissent's analysis, a prose-
cutor could defeat an otherwise valid claim for defense witness immunity merely by re-
fusing to raise the immunity issue and thereby forcing the witness to initiate the requcst.
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nation, I cannot see how we can conclude upon the facts in this
case that defendant has a constitutional right to have his witnesses
immunized as a condition to retrial.4 5
C. Post-Shapiro Developments
Since 1980 New York courts have sought to identify the limits
of the Shapiro doctrine. In People v. Adams 4 6 the defendant was con-
victed of robbery, and the appellate division affirmed without ad-
dressing the defense witness immunity issue.4 7 The defendant
appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that the prosecution's re-
fusal to immunize a prospective defense witness violated both his
due process right to exculpatory testimony and his sixth amendment
right to compulsory process. The defendant contended that the
prosecution had no legitimate reason to withhold immunity because
no charges were pending against the prospective witness at the time
of trial.4 8
The court of appeals rejected the defendant's analysis and af-
firmed the conviction, emphasizing the broad discretion accorded
the prosecution in making immunity determinations. The court
stated that if the prospective witness had been indicted for the same
crime as the defendant, the court would not even have reviewed the
prosecution's decision to refuse immunity.49 The court concluded:
Neither, in our view, can the prosecutor be said to have acted in
bad faith whenever he refuses to grant absolution to a participant
in the crime who has thus far eluded prosecution. Indeed to per-
mit a defendant to override the prosecutor's discretion under
those circumstances could itself lead to abuses of the immunity
statute.
50
The court did not explicitly address Shapiro's "vital exculpatory tes-
timony" prong. The court noted, however, that the prosecutor's re-
fusal of immunity only deprived the defendant of cumulative
45 Id. at 775, 409 N.E.2d at 914, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 439-40.
46 53 N.Y.2d 241, 423 N.E.2d 379, 440 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1981).
47 People v. Adams, 70 A.D.2d 825,417 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1st Dep't 1979) (mem. op.).
48 53 N.Y.2d at 243, 247, 423 N.E.2d at 379, 381, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 902, 904. The
prospective witness had been arrested for the crime, but the state dropped the charges
after an eyewitness failed to identify him as the perpetrator. Id. at 247, 423 N.E.2d at
381, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 904. The witness presumably would have admitted the commis-
sion of the crime and supported the defendant's alibi. Id. at 247-48, 423 N.E.2d at 381-
82, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 904-05. Adams was the first significant New York case in which the
witness sought immunity not for prior perjury, but solely to protect himself from prose-
cution for substantive crimes his testimony would reveal. The court of appeals did not
discuss whether this fact played any part in its analysis, nor is it clear whether the pecu-
liar facts in Adams influenced the court's attitude toward the defendant's request.
49 Id. at 247-48, 423 N.E.2d at 382, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
50 Id., 423 N.E.2d at 381-82, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
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evidence, suggesting that the case could not meet the vital exculpa-
tory testimony standard.5 1
During the next two and a half years New York appellate courts
decided three cases involving defense witness immunity. In each in-
stance the court affirmed the defendant's conviction using the stan-
dards developed in Sapia, Shapiro, and Adams. 52 The courts'
51 Id. at 248, 423 N.E.2d at 382, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 904-05. Evidence may be ex-
cluded as cumulative if it duplicates other evidence already introduced. No set formula
determines how repetitive the evidence must be to justify exclusion. The trial court
must weigh the advantages and disadvantages on a case by case basis. MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 33, § 185, at 545-57 & n.35.
52 People v. Mordino, 83 A.D.2d 775, 443 N.Y.S.2d 469 (4th Dep't) (mem. op.),
appeal denied, 54 N.Y.2d 1030, 430 N.E.2d 1326, 446 N.Y.S.2d 1031 (1981), involved a
felony-murder conviction which the appellate division affirmed. The appellate division
concluded the facts fell short of the prosecutorial misconduct standard because the pro-
spective witness was not a law enforcement agent. Id. at 776, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 470. Fur-
thermore, the defendant had failed to request immunity at trial, and the record indicated
the trial court might not have granted immunity even if requested by the prosecution.
The court did not discuss the vital exculpatory testimony standard. Id. at 776, 443
N.Y.S.2d at 470.
People v. Osorio, 86 A.D.2d 233, 449 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 57
N.Y.2d 671, 439 N.E.2d 886, 454 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1982), involved a gangland murder. Fol-
lowing the conviction of the defendants, a key prosecution witness recanted his trial
testimony. The witness refused to testify at a hearing concerning his recantation without
a grant of full transactional immunity. Id. at 235-37, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 969-71. The pros-
ecution was concerned that the witness, whom the court described as an "extremely
disreputable individual with a significant criminal history," would gain immunity for
other significant crimes revealed during his testimony. The prosecutor therefore of-
fered a limited immunity that would protect the witness from prosecution only for his
prior perjured testimony. The trial court initially endorsed this offer of limited immu-
nity. The witness, however, refused to testify without transactional immunity, and the
court eventually supported the witness's position. On motion after the verdict, the trial
court vacated the defendants' convictions because their due process rights had been
violated under the prosecutorial misconduct analysis. The court noted that the prosecu-
tion had performed numerous unfair acts, such as withholding exculpatory evidence and
conducting an aggressive scheme of plea bargaining with the witness, who was a defend-
ant in another case, to secure his testimony in Osorio. Id. at 237-38, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 970-
71.
The prosecution appealed, and the appellate division reinstated the defendants'
convictions. The appellate division concluded that the prosecutor's refusal of immunity
was not done in bad faith and thus did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct as dis-
cussed in Sapia, Shapiro, and Adams. The court identified three salient factors: first, the
district attorney's legitimate concern that transactional immunity would allow the wit-
ness to evade prosecution for other serious crimes; second, collateral circumstances that
made the witness's change of mind "a classic illustration of an unreliable recantation;"
and third, the prosecution's offer of "perjury only" immunity. Id. at 239-40, 449
N.Y.S.2d at 971-72. Finally, the court noted that the exculpatory evidence withheld by
the prosecution was merely cumulative. Id. at 240, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
The court of appeals returned to the defense witness immunity controversy in Peo-
ple v. Lee, 58 N.Y.2d 773,445 N.E.2d 195, 459 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1982) (mem. op.). In Lee a
witness was willing to provide exculpatory testimony until the trial court warned him
that his testimony could be self-incriminating. The witness invoked his fifth amendment
privilege, and the defendant contended that his due process rights were violated when
the prosecution refused immunity. Id. at 773-75, 445 N.E.2d at 195, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
The court of appeals rejected the defendant's contention and affirmed the convic-
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decisions, however, relied almost exclusively on the prosecutorial
misconduct analysis, ignoring Shapiro's vital exculpatory testimony
prong.
Finally, in 1984 the cases of People v. Owens 53 and People v.
Priester54 provided the New York Court of Appeals with an opportu-
nity to clarify defense witness immunity in New York. Owens was the
first defense witness immunity case after Shapiro in which the appel-
late division reversed a defendant's conviction. In Owens the de-
fendant was charged with rape and wanted to introduce the
testimony of an individual who claimed to have had consensual in-
tercourse with the victim before the alleged rape. This testimony
would have provided an explanation for the physical evidence of
sexual activity introduced at trial.55 Because the victim was an un-
derage female, the prospective witness was concerned that his testi-
mony would be self-incriminating. 56 When the potential witness
invoked his fifth amendment privilege, the trial court urged the
prosecution to confer immunity. The prosecution, however, re-
fused to immunize the witness, and the defendant was convicted. 57
The appellate division reversed the defendant's conviction and
conditioned a new trial on a grant of immunity to the defense wit-
ness. The court implied that reversal was required under either the
prosecutorial misconduct or vital exculpatory testimony standards.
The court noted that although the record disclosed no explicit at-
tempt by the prosecution to influence the witness's testimonial
choice, the evidence indicated that the prosecutor may have coerced
tion. Although the court noted that the trial justice's warning to the witness was more
forcefully worded than necessary, the court concluded that it was not stated "in terms so
intimidating as to interfere with his choice whether to testify." Id. at 775, 445 N.E.2d at
195-96, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 19-20. Consistent with other post-Shapiro decisions, the court
based its holding strictly on the prosecutorial misconduct analysis and ignored the vital
exculpatory testimony standard.
53 97 A.D.2d 855, 469 N.Y.S.2d 249 (3d Dep't 1983) (mem. op.).
54 98 A.D.2d 820, 470 N.Y.S.2d 478 (3d Dep't 1983) (mem. op.), appeal denied, 61
N.Y.2d 911, 462 N.E.2d 1212, 474 N.Y.S.2d 1034 (1984).
55 97 A.D.2d at 855, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
56 Id. Sexual relations with a minor female is punishable as sexual misconduct
under § 130.20 of the New York penal code. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.20 (McKinney
1975). Interestingly, the appellate division failed to note: (1) that the witness had indi-
cated to the grand jury that he had not had intercourse with the victim, Record at 964,
996, People v. Owens, No. 80-37 (Tompkins County Ct. Oct. 26, 1981); (2) that the
prosecutor indicated a strong interest in prosecuting the witness for perjury if he testi-
fied, id. at 994-97, 1001, 1008-10; and (3) that the witness did not reveal whether he
invoked his fifth amendment privilege to avoid prosecution for perjury or for sexual
misconduct. Id. at 1008-10.
57 97 A.D.2d at 855, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 249-50. The appellate division failed to spec-
ify that it was the trial court that requested the grant of immunity. See id.; Record at 994,
1000-03.
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the witness into not testifying.58 The prosecutor knew the witness
was represented by counsel and that his attorney had requested that
no contact occur between the prosecution and the witness without
counsel present. Nevertheless, the prosecutor met separately with
the prospective witness and discussed the witness's participation in
the Owens case. 59 Although the trial record did not reveal what was
discussed in this conversation, the appellate court noted that it did
show the witness and prosecutor disagreed concerning its content.
Regardless of the actual content, the appellate division concluded
that "[t]he opportunity such a meeting presented for impermissible
coercion . . . cannot be denied." 60
The Owens panel found that the prosecution's refusal of immu-
nity to the prospective witness cost the defendant "testimony [that]
was important to [his] defense." 6' The court then noted that the
prosecution had not stated that the witness would be prosecuted for
sexual misconduct should he testify without immunity.62 The court
therefore reasoned that the prosecution could properly be required
to immunize the prospective witness or forego prosecuting the de-
58 97 A.D.2d at 856, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
59 Id.
60 Id. This action violated the American Bar Association's ethical standards for
prosecutors, see STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 3-3.1(f) & comment (1979) ("prosecutor
should avoid interviewing a prospective witness except in the presence of a third per-
son"), and New York's ethical code for lawyers, see N.Y. JUD. LAW app. DR 7-104(A)(1)
(McKinney 1975) (Code of Professional Responsibility) ("A lawyer shall not .. .
[c]ommunicate. . .on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be
represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer
representing such other party .... ") (footnotes omitted). The district attorney vio-
lated DR 7-104 because she interrogated the prospective witness after indicating a
strong interest in prosecuting the witness for perjury. See United States v. Jamil, 546 F.
Supp. 646, 651-54, 658 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (New York prohibits contact between prosecu-
tion and individual who "is being investigated as a possible defendant in a potential
criminal proceeding" once prosecution knows that individual is represented by counsel),
rev'd on other grounds, 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983). Moreover, the prosecutor's actions
violated the constitutional rights of the witness. See People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, 31-
32, 417 N.E.2d 501, 503-04,436 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209-10 (1980) (questioning of individual
who has retained counsel without counsel's presence violates constitutional right to
counsel even where no formal criminal action has commenced).
The possibility that impermissible coercion occurred in Owens is increased because
the witness was a defendant in other pending criminal cases being prosecuted by the
same district attorney. Record at 964, Owens. The appellate division failed to note this
fact in its opinion. The appellate division also failed to address a factor that indicated
that coercion of the witness may have been the prosecutor's goal. The prosecutor ap-
parently made a special effort to accost the witness during one short period when the
witness's attorney was absent. She led the witness to an empty room and conversed with
him, thereby ensuring no third party could testify concerning the conversation. Id. at
996-97. See also N.Y. JUD. LAW app. Canon 9 (McKinney 1975) (Code of Professional
Responsibility) ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even The Appearance Of Professional
Impropriety").
61 97 A.D.2d at 855, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 249-50.
62 Id. at 855, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
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fendant because no conflict existed between the defendant's need
for exculpatory testimony and the prosecution's legitimate interest
in prosecuting a prospective witness. 63 This analysis broke with the
court of appeals's strong endorsement of prosecutorial discretion in
Adams. The Adams court indicated that the prosecution was under
no obligation to demonstrate an intent to prosecute a prospective
defense witness to justify denying that witness immunity.64
Two of the five appellate justices who heard the Owens case dis-
sented. The dissent ignored the majority's reasoning and the "vital
exculpatory testimony" analysis of Shapiro, merely stating that judi-
cial review of the prosecutor's immunity decision is proper only
where "there has been an abuse of. . .discretion through the Dis-
trict Attorney's bad faith or conduct which violates a defendant's
due process right to a fair trial."'65 The dissent concluded that
"[t]he instant case presents no example, or even a claim, of either
prosecutorial abuse or misconduct." 66
People v. Priester67 was the second case in which the appellate
division reversed the defendant's conviction on defense witness im-
munity grounds. Priester was a manslaughter case in which a prose-
cution witness provided key testimony concerning the defendant's
intent and then wanted to recant her testimony. After the trial court
warned the witness concerning the possibility of prosecution for
perjury, she elected to exercise her fifth amendment privilege. The
prosecution refused to immunize the witness, and consequently the
jury never heard the recantation testimony.68
Although the appellate division did not explicitly identify the
basis of its holding, the court apparently relied on the vital exculpa-
tory testimony analysis. The court noted that the witness's testi-
mony was "crucial to [the] defendant," 69 and although the court did
not specifically evaluate the prosecution's conduct, the prosecutor's
actions did not approach the level of misconduct that occurred in
Shapiro or Owens. In Priester the district attorney had no influence on
the witness's refusal to recant her testimony. Moreover, the evi-
dence did not indicate that the prosecutor procured the witness's
original testimony in bad faith.70 The district attorney, however, did
63 Id. at 855-56, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
64 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
65 97 A.D.2d at 857, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 251 (Casey, J., dissenting).
66 Id.
67 98 A.D.2d 820, 470 N.Y.S.2d 478 (3d Dep't 1983) (mem. op.), appeal denied, 61
N.Y.2d 911, 462 N.E.2d 1212, 474 N.Y.S.2d 1034 (1984). Although the same depart-
ment of the appellate division decided both the Owens and Priester cases, the justices on
each panel differed.
68 Id., 470 N.Y.S.2d at 478-79.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 820-21, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80.
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"rely heavily" on the witness's testimony in his summation. 71 Fi-
nally, the court noted that the witness had sought immunity only for
the perjury she had committed, rather than for other substantive
crimes, and identified this as a significant factor in its decision over-
turning the conviction. 72
In both Owens and Priester the prosecution tried to appeal to the
court of appeals. New York law provides two routes from the appel-
late division to the court of appeals. Application for leave to appeal
may be made directly to any appellate division justice who heard the
case or to the court of appeals itself. When this second alternative is
used, the application is assigned to one of the court of appeals
judges at random. 73 In Owens one of the appellate division dissent-
ers granted leave to appeal, thereby forcing the high court to hear
the case.74 In Priester the prosecution applied to the court of appeals
because no judge dissented at the appellate division. A grant of
leave to appeal in Priester would have allowed the court to address
the defense witness immunity issue using two analytically different
cases involving both the prosecutorial misconduct and vital exculpa-
tory testimony prongs of Shapiro. Instead, the court of appeals de-
nied leave to appeal in Priester only three weeks after leave was
granted in Owens. 75
Although the denial of leave in Priester suggested that the court
of appeals would affirm the appellate division's reversal of the de-
fendant's conviction in Owens, the court summarily rejected the ap-
pellate division's conclusions and reinstated the defendant's
conviction in a memorandum opinion. 76 The court found that the
71 Id. at 821, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
72 Id., 470 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
73 N.Y. GRIM. PROC. LAW § 460.20(b) (McKinney 1983). See also id. §§ 450.90,
460.10, 470.05, 470.35 (detailing procedural aspects of appeals to New York Court of
Appeals).
74 Order of Casey, J. (granting leave to appeal to court of appeals) (Jan. 20, 1984).
See N.Y. GRIM. PROC. LAw § 450.90 (McKinney 1983) (court of appeals must review case
certified by appropriate justice of appellate division if case presents issue of law or
mixed law and fact).
75 The court of appeals was or should have been aware that the Owens appeal was
pending when it denied leave in Priester. See id. § 460.20(5) (requiring appellate division
justice granting leave to immediately file copy of appeal certificate with clerk of court of
appeals); N.Y. CT. APPEALS R. 500.2 (requiring appellate counsel to file jurisdictional
statement within 10 days of grant of leave to appeal).
76 People v. Owens, 63 N.Y.2d 824, 472 N.E.2d 26, 482 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1984) (mem.
op.). The court of appeals remitted the case to the appellate division for consideration
of nondefense witness immunity issues that the defendant had previously raised but the
appellate division had not decided. The appellate division affirmed the defendant's con-
viction. People v. Owens, 108 A.D.2d 1014, 1014-15, 485 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585 (3d Dep't
1985).
New York appellate courts differentiate between full opinion decisions and "memo-
randum decisions" which include only a short opinion. The court of appeals in Owens
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prosecutor's contact with the witness outside the presence of his at-
torney was improper77 but refused to "presume overreaching," stat-
ing that "the only record of the content of the conversation
indicates no intimidation or coercion."' 78 Thus, the court reasoned
that the facts in Owens did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct
as defined in Sapia, Shapiro, and Adams. The court also reinforced
Adams by concluding that the lack of charges pending against the
witness did not establish that the prosecutor's refusal of immunity
was in bad faith.79 Finally, the court did not address Shapiro's vital
exculpatory testimony prong.
III
EVALUATION OF CURRENT NEW YORK LAW
Although the New York Court of Appeals has never overruled
or even explicitly questioned its holding or reasoning in People v.
Shapiro,8 0 its recent decisions demonstrate that a defense attorney is
unlikely to succeed in obtaining immunity for a defense witness. 8'
The court acknowledged in Shapiro that ajudge would rarely compel
a grant of immunity for a defense witness; however, the opinion's
language implies that courts should be sensitive to violations of a
defendant's due process and compulsory process rights. The Sha-
piro court identified two situations in which a compelled grant of
immunity for a defense witness would be proper. First, if a prosecu-
tor engaged in unfair actions that tended to mold the evidence avail-
able at trial, the court reasoned it was fair to expect the prosecutor
devoted less than one half page to its analysis of the defense witness immunity issue. Id.
at 825-26, 472 N.E.2d at 27, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 251. This Note uses "(mem. op.)" to
designate short opinion decisions.
77 Id. at 826, 472 N.E.2d at 27, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 50 N.Y.2d 747, 409 N.E.2d 897, 431 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1980). See supra notes 31-45
and accompanying text. But see Owens, 63 N.Y.2d at 825-26, 472 N.E.2d at 27, 482
N.Y.S.2d at 251 (1984) (mem. op.), where the court cites primarily to Sapia and Adanu
and only mentions Shapiro with a "see also" reference. Id.
81 Determining how often defendants raise the defense witness immunity issue is
difficult because most New York trial decisions are unreported. Two reported cases that
did not reach New York's appellate courts discuss defense witness immunity. See People
v. Gonzalez, 120 Misc. 2d 62, 465 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. Grim. Term Kings County
1983) (prospective witness willing to exculpate defendant by testifying to commission of
crime; transactional immunity denial upheld because (1) prosecution willing to grant
use/derived use immunity, (2) witness desired immunity for substantive crime, not just
prior perjury, and (3) defendant had other witnesses to support alibi); In re Noel N., 120
Misc. 2d 380, 465 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Fain. Ct. Kings County 1983) (immunity refused in
delinquency proceeding because (1) defendant's constitutional rights not violated and
(2) family court not so authorized). But see In re Barry M., 93 Misc. 2d 882, 883, 886,
403 N.Y.S.2d 979, 979, 981 (Farn. Ct. Queens County 1978) (New York's immunity stat-
ute is applicable to family court delinquency proceedings).
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to yield his discretion to grant immunity.8 2 Second, the prosecu-
tor's discretion might have to yield, even though no unfair affirma-
tive actions had occurred, if the failure to grant immunity would
deprive the defendant of "vital exculpatory testimony. 8s3
The opinions in Sapia, Shapiro, and Adams describe three situa-
tions in which a prosecutor's affirmative actions would require a
grant of defense witness immunity: first, when the witness is an
agent of the law enforcement authorities and actually participates in
the crime;8 4 second, when the prosecution aggressively threatens
the witness with prosecution for perjury if the witness's current tes-
timony differs from prior testimony;8 5 and third, when a prosecutor
immunizes his witness but refuses immunity for a defendant's wit-
ness.8 6 Although the court has identified these three examples, it
has not eliminated the possibility that other prosecutorial actions
could require a grant of immunity for a defense witness.
The court's opinions in Adams and Owens demonstrate that dis-
trict attorneys generally will be accorded great discretion in making
immunity decisions. In both cases the argument in favor of defense
witness immunity was strong, yet the court upheld the prosecution's
refusal to grant immunity. In Adams the court rejected the defend-
ant's contention that the district attorney should be required to
demonstrate a legitimate interest in prosecuting a prospective wit-
ness to justify denying immunity.8 7 Because there was no practical
possibility of prosecuting the witness in Adams, the prosecutor could
not reasonably argue that a grant of defense witness immunity
would interfere with his discretion to initiate a later prosecution of
the witness. The district attorney's refusal to immunize was there-
82 50 N.Y.2d at 760, 409 N.E.2d at 904, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 429. See supra notes 38-39
and accompanying text.
83 50 N.Y.2d at 760, 409 N.E.2d at 904, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 429. See supra notes 39-40
and accompanying text.
84 See People v. Sapia, 41 N.Y.2d 160, 166, 359 N.E.2d 688, 692, 391 N.Y.S.2d 93,
97 (1976) (dictum), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977). See also People v. Arroyo, 46 N.Y.2d
928, 930, 388 N.E.2d 342, 343, 415 N.Y.S.2d 205, 206 (1979) (mem. op.); People v.
Osorio, 86 A.D.2d 233, 239, 449 N.Y.S.2d 968, 971 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 57
N.Y.2d 671, 439 N.E.2d 886, 454 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1982); People v. Mordino, 83 A.D.2d
775, 776, 443 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470 (4th Dep't), appeal denied, 54 N.Y.2d 1030, 430 N.E.2d
1326, 446 N.Y.S.2d 1031 (1981); People v. Heffron, 59 A.D.2d 263, 267, 399 N.Y.S.2d
501, 504-05 (4th Dep't 1977).
85 See People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d at 247, 423 N.E.2d at 381, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 904;
Shapiro, 50 N.Y.2d at 761, 409 N.E.2d at 905, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 429-30; see also People v.
Lee, 58 N.Y.2d 773, 775, 445 N.E.2d 195, 195, 459 N.Y.S.2d 19, 19 (1982) (mem. op.);
Osorio, 86 A.D.2d at 239, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
86 See Adams, 53 N.Y.2d at 247, 423 N.E.2d at 381, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 904; Shapiro, 50
N.Y.2d at 760, 409 N.E.2d at 904, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 429; see also Osorio, 86 A.D.2d at 239,
449 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
87 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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fore probably a bad faith attempt to restrict the evidence available at
the defendant's trial.
In Owens the evidence strongly suggested that the prosecution
purposefully engaged in improper actions resulting in the imper-
missible molding of the evidence.88 Indeed, short of a Shapiro situa-
tion where the coercion occurred at trial and on the record, a more
compelling scenario for defense witness immunity is difficult to en-
vision.8 9 Certainly the prosecution's conversation with the witness,
which the appellate division characterized as an "inexcusable viola-
tion of [the witness's] right to counsel," 90 meets the Sapia standard
"that the People had placed themselves on the horns of a dilemma
and must either grant effective immunity . . . or, alternatively, ac-
cept a dismissal of the prosecution." 9' Instead, the court of appeals
refused to "presume overreaching, ' 92 thus demonstrating the high
burden of proof a defendant must meet to prevail on the defense
witness immunity question.
One major question concerning the prosecutorial misconduct
prong remains unanswered. Presumably a court will grant defense
witness immunity only when a witness exercises his fifth amendment
privilege,93 thereby depriving the defendant of relevant exculpatory
evidence. 94 The court of appeals, however, has never defined how
probative the evidence must be, to warrant immunity when
prosecutorial misconduct has occurred. In fact, the court has yet to
identify what role, if any, the importance of the evidence denied to
the defendant plays in the court's prosecutorial misconduct analysis.
Because the Shapiro court drew a line between the prosecutorial mis-
conduct and the vital exculpatory testimony standards, the miscon-
duct prong can apparently be satisfied by something less than vital
exculpatory evidence. Whether such evidence must be noncumula-
88 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
89 Arguably, the facts in Owens point more directly to the conclusion that the prose-
cutor purposefully acted to control what evidence would be admitted at trial than do the
facts in Shapiro. In Shapiro a sudden change in the prospective witnesses' proposed testi-
mony surprised the prosecutor during the trial. His threat of prosecution for perjury,
although improper, was apparently a spontaneous reaction. In Owens, however, the
events strongly suggest that the prosecutor acted purposefully to deny the defendant
critical testimony. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the court
of appeals reversed the conviction in Shapiro and affirmed the conviction in Owens.
90 Owens, 63 N.Y.2d at 826, 472 N.E.2d at 27, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
91 Sapia, 41 N.Y.2d at 166, 359 N.E.2d at 692, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 97 (dictum).
92 Owens, 63 N.Y.2d at 826, 472 N.E.2d at 27, 482 N.'.S.2d at 251.
93 The witness must formally invoke the fifth amendment, and the court must sat-
isfy itself that the invocation is proper. See supra note 14. These requirements also apply
to a defense witness immunity request under the vital exculpatory testimony prong.
94 To be relevant, evidence must be both probative and material. Evidence is pro-
bative if it tends to establish the proposition for which it is offered. Evidence is material
if the proposition for which it is offered is a matter in issue in the case. MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 33, § 185, at 541.
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tive95 remains unknown.
The court of appeals's analysis of defense witness immunity has
concentrated almost exclusively on Shapiro's prosecutorial miscon-
duct prong. None of the subsequent cases, in either the appellate
division or the court of appeals, has explicitly addressed what cir-
cumstances require a grant of immunity based on Shapiro's vital ex-
culpatory testimony prong. Adams implicitly requires that the
testimony be noncumulative. 96 The dearth of discussion on this is-
sue, coupled with the courts' reluctance to reverse convictions on
defense witness immunity grounds, implies that New York courts
will override the prosecution's discretion because of a denial of vital
exculpatory testimony only in extraordinary circumstances.
Priester 97 does not easily fit into this analytical framework. In
Priester the prosecutor committed no significant improper act, and
hence the appellate division must have based its reversal on the dep-
rivation of noncumulative, critically important testimony.98 If the
court of appeals sought to validate the vital exculpatory testimony
analysis in its denial of leave to appeal,99 it should have done so
explicitly. The court's denial of leave to appeal was especially
troublesome in light of the decision in Owens, a far more compelling
case for reversal, which arrived at the court contemporaneously with
Pridster.
IV
PROPOSALS
A. Parameters of the Problem
Any reform in the defense witness immunity area must account
for the conflicting interests involved. A defendant has rights under
the sixth and fourteenth amendments to compulsory process and
exculpatory evidence.100 A witness, however, is privileged under
the fifth amendment to refrain from self-incrimination.' 0 ' Finally,
the legislature created immunity as a prosecutorial tool to facilitate
95 See supra note 5 1.
96 The court firmly rejected the defendant's contention that prosecutorial miscon-
duct had occurred. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. The court then noted
that the prosecutor's refusal of immunity only deprived the defendant of cumulative
evidence. 53 N.Y.2d at 248, 423 N.E.2d at 382, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 904-05. The court
therefore apparently used this rationale to deny the defense witness immunity request
under the vital exculpatory testimony prong. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
97 People v. Priester, 98 A.D.2d 820, 270 N.Y.S.2d 478 (3d Dep't 1983) (mem. op.),
appeal denied, 61 N.Y.2d 911, 462 N.E.2d 1212, 474 N.Y.S.2d 1034 (1984).
98 Id. at 820-21, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying
text.
99 Priester, 61 N.Y.2d 911, 462 N.E.2d 1212, 474 N.Y.S.2d 1034 (1984).
100 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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combatting crime, not as a device to protect defendants' rights or to
ensure that all relevant testimony reaches the jury. 10 2 A forced
grant of immunity may significantly restrict the prosecution's discre-
tion to decide whom to prosecute, especially in a jurisdiction that
utilizes transactional immunity.'0 3
B. Judicial Reform
The New York Court of Appeals can significantly increase the
protection of defendants' rights by implementing several moderate
reforms. First, the court should identify the threshold requirements
that a defendant must satisfy before the judiciary will consider
whether a prosecutor's actions require a grant of defense witness
immunity under the prosecutorial misconduct prong. Specifically,
the court of appeals must decide whether a deprivation of cumula-
tive and/or less than critically important evidence may support a de-
fense witness immunity request, and if so, what analysis a court
should use to evaluate the importance of the evidence to the
defendant.10 4
Second, the court should re-examine the prosecutorial miscon-
duct analysis as applied in Owens '0 5 and require the prosecution to
grant immunity for a defense witness or forego prosecuting the de-
fendant when the evidence indicates a strong possibility that the
prosecutor coerced the witness to keep him silent. Granting de-
fense witness immunity only in the most flagrant incidents of
prosecutorial misconduct ignores the prosecution's obligation to
maintain high ethical standards in its pursuit of justice. 10 6 The
court's decision in Owens is especially difficult to justify because it
was only the prosecutor's improper private contact with the witness
102 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
103 See supra notes 10, 16 and accompanying text.
104 In Adams the New York Court of Appeals implied that the evidence must be
noncumulative to support a defense witness immunity request. See supra note 96 and
accompanying text. The court's opinion in Sapia may imply that the evidence must be
highly probative. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
Most courts and commentators consider a deprivation of noncumulative, clearly ex-
culpatory evidence a prerequisite for a grant of defense witness immunity. See, e.g.,
United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 639-41 (5th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
825 (1982); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 778 (2d Cir. 1980) (dictum), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981); Note, Balancing the Interests, supra note 9, at 818; Note, The
Due Process Right, supra note 1, at 325. But see United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887, 891-92
(9th Cir. 1983) (evidence must merely be relevant); Comment, Defense W1itness Inmunit y
and the Right to a Fair Trial, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 409-10 (1980) (arguing that immunity
may be appropriate when otherwise defendant would be deprived of noncumulative rel-
evant evidence that is not "clearly exculpatory").
105 People v. Owens, 63 N.Y.2d 824,472 N.E.2d 26,482 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1984) (mem.
op.). See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
106 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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that created the uncertainty whether coercion had occurred. 10 7 The
different results in Shapiro and Owens can only encourage improper
covert behavior by prosecuting attorneys because the decisions sug-
gest that the outcome of a case will be governed not by the propriety
of the prosecutor's actions, but by whether the causal link between
those actions and the witness's refusal to testify is demonstrated be-
yond any doubt.
Third, the court should revive Shapiro's vital exculpatory testi-
mony prong.108 The court's meager discussion of this standard in
both Shapiro and subsequent cases has generated few criteria for de-
termining when a defendant's need for testimony should override
the prosecutor's discretion in conferring immunity. The court
should identify what specific factors a trial court should consider
when faced with an immunity request based on the vital exculpatory
testimony prong.
Apparently a threshold requirement is that the witness's invoca-
tion of the fifth amendment deprives the defendant of noncumula-
tive, clearly exculpatory evidence.10 9 Once this requirement is met,
the court should balance the defendant's need for the evidence
against the district attorney's interest in prosecuting the witness.
The trial court should compare the magnitude of the defendant's
and witness's crimes 10 and consider whether the prosecutor's re-
fusal to confer immunity is motivated by actual intent and ability to
prosecute the prospective witness. This approach would require
New York courts to critically analyze the prosecution's interest in
prosecuting a prospective witness. It would not, however, overrule
the court's decision in Adams. In that case the court merely rejected
the defendant's contention that the prosecution's refusal of defense
witness immunity was per se unreasonable whenever the witness was
not currently under indictment." 1 Under the proposed analysis a
court could deny a defense witness immunity request when the pros-
ecution is conducting an investigation with a reasonable likelihood
of future prosecution." 12
107 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
108 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
109 In Adams the court of appeals implied that the exculpatory evidence must be
noncumulative; see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
110 Because prosecution of the defendant who allegedly committed the most serious
crime would presumably serve the public interest, courts should hesitate to grant de-
fense witness immunity requests when the witness would receive immunity for a crime
that is significantly more serious than the crime the defendant is accused of.
111 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
112 A court should not consider whether the prosecutor attempted to induce the
witness to testify by an informal promise of immunity. These "informal immunity
grants" are private agreements between prosecutors and witnesses and fall outside the
statutory immunity structure. Although this technique provides the greatest flexibility
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In evaluating the magnitude of a prospective witness's crime,
courts should differentiate between a witness seeking immunity for
prior perjury and one seeking immunity for other substantive crimes
that his testimony might reveal. A court generally should be more
willing to grant immunity for prior perjury than for other substan-
tive crimes because perjury will probably be a less serious offense.
Furthermore, perjury convictions are difficult to achieve, and hence
it is unlikely an immunity grant for prior perjury will'interfere with a
subsequent prosecution of the witness.' 1 3 Although the court of ap-
for the prosecution by enabling the district attorney to fashion the grant to the facts of
the particular case, it also violates the spirit, if not the letter, of New York's immunity
statute. Informal agreements allow prosecutors to evade the legislature's intent that
immunity in New York be the broader transactional variety. See supra note 16 and ac-
companying text.
Moreover, the New York Court of Appeals recently held that a prosecutor's infor-
mal promise of immunity does not activate the immunity statute and could, at most,
entitle the witness to suppression of any incriminating testimony given. People v. Dun-
bar, 53 N.Y.2d 868, 870, 423 N.E.2d 36, 37, 440 N.Y.S.2d 613, 614 (1981) (mem. op.).
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.45(1), (2)(b)(i) (McKinney 1981) (confession must be
suppressed if it is product of promise by law enforcement official and promise "creates a
substantial risk that the defendant might falsely incriminate himself"). But see People v.
Gonzalez, 120 Misc. 2d 62, 64, 465 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (Sup. Ct. Crim. Term Kings
County 1983) (dictum) (informal promise of immunity binding on prosecution if placed
on record at trial). Because informal grants typically will be unenforceable against the
prosecution, a witness cannot be compelled to testify when offered only an informal
promise of immunity. An opposite conclusion would violate both New York's immunity
statute, see supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text, and the fifth amendment, see infra
note 124. Given the discretionary nature of the witness's decision whether to testify
under an informal grant, the judiciary should not consider a prospective defense wit-
ness's refusal to testify without formal statutory immunity when evaluating the defense
witness immunity request.
Informal immunity grants have arisen in two New York defense witness immunity
cases: People v. Osorio, 86 A.D.2d 233, 449 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 57
N.Y.2d 671, 439 N.E.2d 886, 454 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1982) (discussed supra note 52), and
Gonzalez, 120 Misc. 2d 62, 465 N.Y.S.2d 471 (discussed supra note 81). Neither court
questioned the validity of the informal, nontransactional immunity that was offered, and
both courts' denial of defense witness immunity was influenced by the offers of limited
immunity that the defendants declined to accept; in Gonzalez, this offer of informal im-
munity "weighed heavily" in the court's decision to refuse defense witness immunity.
Gonzalez, 120 Misc. 2d at 67, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 474. See also Osorio, 86 A.D.2d at 239-40,
449 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
113 Although frequently described as "one of the most odious crimes in our law,"
Gershman, The "Perjury Trap," 129 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 636 (1981), perjury frequently
entails a penalty "far below substantive offenses." United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d
769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981). See also Gershman, supra, at
626 n.5.
In New York a perjury conviction cannot be based on the uncorroborated testimony
of a single witness. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 210.50 (McKinney 1975). A similar "two witness"
rule led to "much lower conviction rates for perjury than for other crimes" in federal
courts. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 201 (1967). New York adopted this rule specifi-
cally "to make convictions for perjury more difficult to obtain than in the case of most
other crimes." People v. Gleason, 285 A.D. 278, 286, 136 N.Y.S.2d 220, 228 (1st Dep't
1954) (citations omitted).
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peals has never directly addressed this issue, Shapiro implies that a
defense witness immunity grant for past perjury is more acceptable
than one covering a substantive crime.1 14
Fourth, the court of appeals should adopt a specific procedure
for evaluating defense witness immunity requests using a structured
in camera hearing.1 15 This procedure would ensure the maximum
protection for the rights of the defendant and the witness while pro-
viding maximum flexibility for the prosecution. 116 Once a defend-
ant demonstrates that a defense witness will refuse to testify without
immunity, the court should hold a two-stage in camera hearing.
When the immunity request is based on alleged prosecutorial
misconduct, the judge would first examine the witness using the
questions the defense attorney intends to ask at trial. During this
stage, only the judge, court recorder, witness, and witness's attorney
would be present. The defense attorney, however, should have an
opportunity to present oral argument concerning the importance of
the witness's testimony.
If the judge concludes that the value of the witness's testimony
warrants consideration of a grant of defense witness immunity, the
judge would proceed to the second stage of the hearing. The de-
fense and prosecuting attorneys would present witnesses and any
other evidence relevant to the claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
Finally, the court would hear argument from the defense and prose-
cution concerning the magnitude of the alleged misconduct and
would then rule on the immunity request. This two-step procedure
will allow the court to decide the issue without compromising the
witness's right against self-incrimination or revealing the defend-
114 In Shapiro the court stated: "[T]he protection the witnesses sought was not from
disclosure of any past criminal activities but solely from the possibility that any testi-
mony they would give. . . would precipitate their prosecution for perjury." 50 N.Y.2d
at 758, 409 N.E.2d at 903, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 428. The court failed to elaborate on this
point, however, and it is uncertain what role it played in the decision. New York courts
have cited Shapiro as support for this perjury/substantive crime dichotomy. See Prieste;
98 A.D.2d at 821,470 N.Y.S.2d at 480; Gonzalez, 120 Misc. 2d at 66, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
115 In both People v. Sapia, 41 N.Y.2d at 162, 359 N.E.2d at 690, 391 N.Y.S.2d at
95, and People v. Shapiro, 50 N.Y.2d at 759,409 N.E.2d at 903-04,431 N.Y.S.2d at 427-
28, the trial court used an in camera hearing to evaluate the immunity request. Neither
court, however, was able to resolve the controversy, apparently at least in part because
of the lack of a well-designed procedure.
116 Commentators generally endorse the use of an in camera hearing for immunity
requests. See, e.g., Note, Balancing the Interests, supra note 9, at 815-17; Comment, supra
note 104, at 411-14. But see Note, The Constitutional Right, supra note 1, at 237-38 (in
camera hearing will not generate sufficient information for court to evaluate adequately
government's interest in refusing immunity). Cf. Bauer, Reflections on the Role of Statutoy
Imnmunity in the Criminal Justice System, 67J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 143, 149-50 (1976)
(opposing in camera hearing to evaluate request for immunity for prosecution witnesses).
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ant's strategy before trial. Moreover, the jury will not hear irrele-
vant allegations of prosecutorial improprieties.
When an alleged deprivation of vital exculpatory testimony is
the basis for the defense witness immunity request, the first stage of
the in camera hearing would proceed as detailed above. The second
stage, however, would consist of argument from the district attorney
concerning his interest in prosecuting the prospective witness. Dur-
ing this stage only the judge, court recorder, and district attorney
would be present.1 17 The judge would rule on the defense witness
immunity request after balancing the defendant's need for the evi-
dence against the state's interest in prosecuting the witness. 118 This
procedure will generate the most complete body of data possible for
the court's evaluation and yet protect the witness from self-incrimi-
nation. Furthermore, it will shield sensitive information of both the
prosecution and the defense by excluding the opposition when each
side presents its position to the court.
Finally, the judiciary should not grant immunity to a defense
witness absent a request from the prosecution. Although "judicially
conferred immunity" may be the most direct and effective way to
protect a defendant's rights, it violates the New York immunity stat-
ute 19 and interferes with a district attorney's discretion in deter-
mining whom to prosecute. 120 Under the current system, once the
117 The ex parte nature of this stage of the hearing does not violate the defendant's
due process rights. See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 778 (2d Cir. 1980) (sug-
gesting that trial courts should consider defense witness immunity requests using ex
parte affidavits from prosecution), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981). See also Flanagan,
supra note 11, at 465-66 (hearing to consider prosecution's interest in witness should be
ex parte; defendant has no right to attend).
118 See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
119 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 50.30 (McKinney 1981). See supra note 15 and accompa-
nying text.
120 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
New York courts have given scant attention to "judicially conferred immunity,"
probably because of the clear statutory rejection of that approach. See Shapiro, 50 N.Y.2d
at 773 n.5, 409 N.E.2d at 913 n.5, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 438 n.5 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting)
(legislature's delegation of immunity power to prosecution precludes judicial intrusion);
Brockway, 59 N.Y.2d at 190-91, 451 N.E.2d at 173-74, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 415-16 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting) (courts should strictly adhere to provisions of immunity statute). But see Peo-
ple v. Osorio, 108 Misc. 2d 100, 106, 436 N.Y.S.2d 958, 962 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1981) (dictum) (interpreting Shapiro to authorize direct judicial grant of immunity), rev'd
on other grounds, 86 A.D.2d 233, 449 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1st Dep't), appeal disnissed, 57 N.Y.2d
671, 439 N.E.2d 886, 454 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1982).
In the federal courts, only one circuit court has endorsed judicially conferred immu-
nity. See Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1980) (alternative hold-
ing) (discussed supra note 7). The Supreme Court has held that the federal immunity
statute does not authorize the judiciary to grant immunity on its own initiative. United
States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 616 (1984); Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 253-54
& n.11, 261 (1983). The Virgin Islands court, however, predicated its judicially conferred
immunity on inherent judicial powers arising under the fifth amendment. Virgin Islands,
615 F.2d at 969-70.
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court determines that defense witness immunity is warranted, the
prosecution must either request immunity for the prospective wit-
ness or forego prosecution of the current defendant. This approach
preserves both the defendant's rights and the prosecution's discre-
tion, and precludes a court from deciding an issue in which it has
little expertise. 12 1
C. Statutory Reform
The New York legislature should amend the state's immunity
statute to require the in camera hearing detailed above. Legislative
adoption of a uniform procedure would ensure that New York
courts consider all relevant factors when evaluating a defense wit-
ness immunity request. 22
The New York legislature should also amend the immunity stat-
ute to create a limited immunity protecting the witness only from
prosecution for prior perjured testimony. 123 Testifying under this
form of immunity, however, should be discretionary with the wit-
ness. Forcing an individual to testify without protection from prose-
cution for substantive crimes revealed probably violates the fifth
amendment proscription against compelled self-incrimination. 124
Although most witnesses probably would refuse to testify without a
121 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
122 See supra note 115.
123 New York courts generally have rejected the validity of immunity grants that pro-
vide less protection than the full transactional immunity prescribed by statute. See, e.g.,
People v. McFarlan, 42 N.Y.2d 896, 897, 366 N.E.2d 1357, 1357, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1003,
1003 (1977) (prosecutor's grant of limited immunity covering criminal acts performed
only during specified period of time held to be grant of full transactional immunity);
People v. Masiello, 28 N.Y.2d 287, 289-90, 270 N.E.2d 305, 306-07, 321 N.Y.S.2d 577,
579-80 (1971) (grant of use/derived use immunity insufficient to satisfy immunity stat-
ute; witness's contempt conviction for refusing to testify reversed); Felder v. Supreme
Court, 44 A.D.2d 1, 2-4, 7, 352 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707-09, 712 (4th Dep't 1974) (witness's
contempt conviction for refusing to testify reversed because immunity was limited to
specified criminal acts). But see Osorio, 86 A.D.2d at 239, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 972, appeal
dismissed, 57 N.Y.2d 671, 439 N.E.2d 886, 454 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1982) (trial court errone-
ously stated that limited "perjury only" immunity is available in New York; appellate
division reversed without addressing propriety of limited immunity). For a discussion of
Osorio, see supra note 52. The arrangement in Osorio probably would have been valid if
done as a noncoerced, informal agreement between the prosecution and the witness,
and not as a formal grant of immunity. See supra note 112 for a discussion of informal
immunity grants.
124 In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the Supreme Court held that
use/derived use immunity was constitutional because the protection granted was coex-
tensive with the witness's invocation of his constitutional rights. After testifying under a
grant of use/derived use immunity, the witness was no worse off than he was prior to
testifying. Id. at 453. For further discussion of this case, see supra note 16. Compelling
a witness to testify after receiving "perjury only" immunity would encounter substantial
constitutional problems if the witness revealed participation in other substantive crimes.
In such a case the grant of immunity would not be coextensive with the witness's invoca-
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grant of transactional immunity,125 this reform provides an easy so-
lution when a witness is willing to testify with "perjury only" immu-
nity. If the witness is willing to testify with this limited immunity,
the court should accord less weight to the prosecution's opposition
to the immunity grant because the state may still prosecute the wit-
ness for any substantive crimes revealed. Courts should therefore
require a grant of such immunity even when the prospective testi-
mony is relevant but only cumulative, unless the prosecution dem-
onstrates a legitimate intent and ability to prosecute the witness for
earlier perjury. 126
tion of his fifth amendment privilege because the witness would be significantly worse
off after receiving immunity and testifying than he was prior to testifying.
Compelling testimony under "perjury only" immunity could arguably be constitu-
tional if the witness was allowed to invoke the fifth amendment prior to incriminating
himself in any nonperjury crimes. This would merely require the witness to realize that
he was about to incriminate himself for crimes not covered by his immunity grant. Con-
stitutional problems would clearly arise, however, when the past perjury and substantive
crime were closely related. This could occur when the defendant was accused of sub-
stantive crime X and the witness had formerly testified that he had not committed crime
X, but now wanted to assist the.defendant by admitting both the commission of the
substantive crime and his past perjury about the incident.
125 See, e.g., Osorio, 86 A.D.2d at 237, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 970-71 (witness demanded full
transactional immunity).
126 A third reform the legislature should consider is replacing transactional immu-
nity with use/derived use immunity. For a discussion of these types of immunity, see
supra note 16. Some commentators argue that a forced conferral of use/derived use
immunity restricts the prosecution's discretion less than a compelled transactional im-
munity grant does. E.g., Note, "The Public Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence'" The
Defendant's Constitutional Right to Witness Immunity, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1216-18 (1978);
Note, Witnessfor the Defense, supra note 12, at 1715. Under use/derived use immunity the
district attorney retains some ability to prosecute the witness, whereas a transactional
immunity grant eliminates the possibility of future prosecution. Other commentators
contend, however, that little practical difference exists between transactional and
use/derived use immunity. Carlson, supra note 16, at 134, 136; Flanagan, supra note 11,
at 461; Mykkeltvedt, supra note 9, at 690-91. Thus, a change from transactional to
use/derived use immunity might have little effect. Finally, abandonment of transactional
immunity might frustrate the purpose of the immunity statute. Some authorities believe
that transactional immunity is more effective than use/derived use immunity in motivat-
ing recalcitrant witnesses to testify fully. See I W. LAFAv E & J. ISRAEL, supra note 10,
§ 8.11, at 689 (proponents of transactional immunity argue that some witnesses hesitate
to testify fully under use/derived use immunity because some possibility of prosecution
remains).
Adoption of use/derived use immunity may be warranted, however, because of the
New York Court of Appeals's demonstrated reluctance to restrict prosecutorial discre-
tion by a grant of transactional defense witness immunity. The admittedly small change
that would result from adopting use/derived use immunity might enable the courts to
grant defense witness immunity in close cases such as Sapia, Adams, and Owens. In con-
sidering whether to adopt use/derived use immunity, the New York legislature must
consider how this reform would affect both prosecution and defense witness immunity
grants. This evaluation is beyond the scope of this Note.
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CONCLUSION
In People v. Shapiro the New York Court of Appeals adopted a
position protecting defendants' rights through defense witness im-
munity. The court went beyond the analysis of its earlier opinion in
People v. Sapia and concluded that a defendant's due process and
compulsory process rights may require a grant of immunity for a
defense witness where either prosecutorial misconduct affects the
evidence available at trial or a denial of immunity otherwise deprives
the defendant of vital exculpatory testimony. Although Shapiro was
strongly supportive of defendants' rights, the court's subsequent de-
cisions in People v. Adams and People v. Owens demonstrate that de-
fendants in New York will encounter substantial difficulties in
overriding the prosecution's discretion in conferring immunity.
Although the court of appeals's position on defense witness im-
munity provides less protection for a defendant's rights than might
be optimal, the real shortcoming of the court's approach to immu-
nity is the current uncertainty of the law that the Owens decision and
the denial of leave to appeal in People v. Priester have generated. The
court of appeals should alleviate this confusion in the next defense
witness immunity case by providing a detailed discussion of a de-
fendant's rights to immunized testimony. Finally, the judiciary
should utilize a two-stage in camera hearing procedure for evaluating
defense witness immunity requests because it will best protect the
interests of the defendant, witness, and prosecution.
Furthermore, the New York legislature should act to solve the
defense witness immunity dilemma. Adoption of the two-stage in
camera hearing procedure will ensure uniform consideration of all
relevant factors. Limited "perjury only" immunity will provide an
easy solution when a witness is willing to testify with this lower level
of protection. Implementation of these proposals will increase the
protection accorded a defendant's due process and compulsory pro-
cess rights and still preserve the witness's fifth amendment privilege
and the prosecutor's discretion. The New York experience could
serve as a model solution to the defense witness immunity problem
for the federal and other state jurisdictions.
Thomas D. Dinackus
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